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Communication efficient and strongly secure secret
sharing schemes based on algebraic geometry codes
Umberto Martı´nez-Pen˜as, Student Member, IEEE
Abstract—Secret sharing schemes with optimal and universal
communication overheads have been obtained independently by
Bitar et al. and Huang et al. However, their constructions require
a finite field of size q > n, where n is the number of shares, and
do not provide strong security. In this work, we give a general
framework to construct communication efficient secret sharing
schemes based on sequences of nested linear codes, which allows
to use in particular algebraic geometry codes and allows to obtain
strongly secure and communication efficient schemes. Using this
framework, we obtain: 1) schemes with universal and close to
optimal communication overheads for arbitrarily large lengths n
and a fixed finite field, 2) the first construction of schemes with
universal and optimal communication overheads and optimal
strong security (for restricted lengths), having in particular the
component-wise security advantages of perfect schemes and the
security and storage efficiency of ramp schemes, and 3) schemes
with universal and close to optimal communication overheads
and close to optimal strong security defined for arbitrarily large
lengths n and a fixed finite field.
Index Terms—Secret sharing, algebraic geometry codes, com-
munication efficiency, communication bandwidth, strong security,
asymptotic secret sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
A
SECRET sharing scheme [4], [28] is a procedure to
encode a secret into n shares, given bijectively to n
parties, in such a way that some specified collections of
shares give all the information about the secret, while other
collections of shares give no information at all. It is usual to
specify such collections by threshold values t < r: the secret
can be recovered from any r shares, while no collection of t
shares gives any information about the secret.
Traditionally, efforts have been made to obtain schemes
where r is as low and t is as large as possible. The first
construction, by Shamir [28], consists of a secret sharing
scheme attaining information rate 1/n (perfect scheme) and
any threshold values 0 ≤ t < r ≤ n with t = r− 1, which are
optimal. Later, this construction was extended in [5], [37] to
higher information rates ℓ/n and threshold values t = r − ℓ,
which are again optimal. Schemes where the information rate
is ℓ/n > 1/n (non-perfect schemes) are also called ramp
schemes, and allow the shares to be smaller than the secret,
hence allowing more flexibility and efficiency in terms of
storage, at the cost of a lower privacy threshold t < r − 1.
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All these previous optimal constructions require a finite field
of size q > n, which in many situations requires performing
computations over large fields, reduces the storage efficiency
since the shares are larger, and provides less robustness against
erasures (see Subsection I-A).
In the works [23], [25] and later in [10], [14], [21], more
general frameworks for constructing secret sharing schemes
are given in terms of linear (block) codes. Thanks to these
approaches, Shamir’s scheme is extended to schemes based on
algebraic geometry codes [6], [8], [9], [10], [14], [12], which
may have arbitrarily large length n for any fixed finite field
at the cost of achieving close to optimal parameters, instead
of optimal, being the difference dependent only on the field
size. This implies that, for a given difference with respect to
the optimal case, we may fix a suitable field size and the
achievable lengths are not restricted.
On the other hand, as noticed first in [35] and then in [19],
the overall amount of communication between the contacted
parties and the user (decoding bandwidth), in a given secret
sharing scheme, can be decreased by contacting more than r
shares. A lower bound on the communication overhead (the
difference between the decoding bandwidth and the informa-
tion contained in the secret) was first given in [35] for perfect
schemes, and then in [19] for the general case.
A modification of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme was given
independently in [3] and in [19] for any information rate,
with optimal threshold values r and t, and where optimal
communication overheads are simultaneously achieved (uni-
versal) for any δ contacted shares and any δ in an arbitrary
set ∆ ⊆ [r, n]. However, as Shamir’s scheme, this construction
requires a finite field of size q > n, which in this case is more
critical since shares are exponentiated by a number α of order
at least n for fixed information rates (see Subsection I-A).
Therefore, the following question arises naturally: can we
modify or extend the constructions in [3], [19] so that we
may apply algebraic geometry codes and hence obtain near
optimal thresholds and universal near optimal communication
overheads for arbitrarily large lengths n and a fixed finite field?
In this work, we answer the previous question positively,
giving a general framework for constructing communication
efficient secret sharing schemes based on sequences of nested
linear codes in a similar way to that of [10], [14], [21],
[23], [25]. Afterwards and using algebraic geometry codes,
we obtain the desired communication efficient secret shar-
ing schemes of arbitrary length and fixed finite field. More
concretely, thanks to our general framework, we reduce the
problem of finding long communication efficient secret sharing
schemes to the well-known problem of finding algebraic
curves with many rational points and low genus [20], [31],
2[34]. We highlight here that such secret sharing schemes can
be constructed explicitly whenever the generator matrices of
the corresponding algebraic geometry codes are known. This
is the case of the families in [30], [32], [33] and [16], [29].
Again in this case, the difference with the lowest commu-
nication overheads depends only on the field size, and hence
for a given defect with respect to the optimal value, we may
fix a suitable field size, and the achievable lengths are not
restricted. Moreover, as we will show, one can see the defect
with respect to the optimal case just on the privacy threshold
t, as in previous schemes based on algebraic geometry codes,
meaning that the obtained communication overheads give the
same improvement on the reconstruction threshold r as in the
optimal case (see Example 17).
The introduced universal construction will expand the alpha-
bet size in a similar way to that of the universal constructions
in [3], [19]. As in [3], we will also give a non-universal
construction that has a significant smaller alphabet.
On the other hand, our general framework also allows
us to obtain schemes that are communication efficient and
strongly secure at the same time. Strongly secure schemes
were introduced in [37], and allow to keep components of the
secret safe even when more than t shares are eavesdropped.
In such a scheme, if the secret is constituted by ℓ components
(each considered as a secret by itself), where ℓ/n is the
information rate, then no information about any tuple of ℓ−µ
components is leaked if t + µ shares are eavesdropped. In
particular, in an optimal strongly secure ramp scheme with
information rate ℓ/n and also optimal thresholds t = r − ℓ,
no information about any component of the secret is leaked
by eavesdropping any r − 1 shares, as in Shamir’s optimal
perfect scheme (although information about the whole secret
may still leak), while having the storage advantages of optimal
ramp schemes (since it actually is an optimal ramp scheme).
In conclusion, an optimal strongly secure ramp scheme has
the component-wise security advantages of perfect schemes
and the security and storage efficiency of ramp schemes.
By means of the framework developed in this paper, we
obtain the first construction of a secret sharing scheme with
universal and optimal communication efficiency and optimal
strong security at the same time. However, it requires a
finite field of size q > ℓ + n, as previous constructions of
optimal strongly secure schemes [26]. As before, to relax this
requirement, we give another construction based on algebraic
geometry codes, whose communication efficiency and strong
security are close to the optimal values (again depending on
q and not on n), while having arbitrarily large lengths n
over a fixed finite field. Such strongly secure schemes based
on algebraic geometry codes were obtained in [24] without
communication efficiency.
For convenience of the reader, a comparison between the
obtained constructions in this paper (Corollaries 14, 25 and
26) and the ones in the literature is summarized in Fig. 1.
A. Motivation and meaning of our contributions
As mentioned at the beginning of the Introduction, the
optimal schemes in [3], [19] require that q = Ω(n), whereas
those based on algebraic geometry codes may have arbitrarily
large lengths n for a fixed field size q. Here we develop why
this relaxed condition may be crucial in the applications:
1) Secure multi-party computation [2], [6], [8], [9], [10],
[13], [12] allows to securely compute any function [1], [7].
Such functions are usually defined over small fields and
computing them requires several rounds of operations. Hence
a field size q = Ω(n) may be inefficient and restrictive for
large number of parties n.
The schemes in [3], [19] and this work are linear, which
allows to securely compute any linear function or any binary
function, and is of interest, for instance, in additively homo-
morphic verifiable secret sharing. Our schemes are multiplica-
tive for certain parameters. See Appendix B for details.
2) The known communication efficient schemes [3], [19]
require exponentiating secret and share sizes by a large number
α, which reduces storage flexibility. In the best of scenarios
(Construction 1), for fixed information rate L we have that
α = λn for a constant L < λ < 1. Thus each share in [3],
[19] has size at least nλn, that is Ω(n log(n)) bits. In this case,
our schemes based on asymptotically good algebraic geometry
codes allow the secret and share sizes to be O(qλn), for some
L < λ < 1 and small q. Hence each share is of O(n) bits.
See the observations at the end of Subsection IV-C.
3) On most erasure channels, increasing code lengths (num-
ber of participants) while keeping or decreasing symbol sizes
(share sizes) provides more robustness even if the allowed
fraction of erasures is lower. This is even more critical
on adversarial scenarios where the adversary chooses which
fraction of symbols to erase. For instance assume that we have
a scheme with length 1000 and symbol size 216, and a second
scheme with length 4000 and symbol size 24. If the adversary
erases 1/4 of symbols of size 24, he or she may make
reconstruction impossible when using the first scheme, even
if it has optimal reconstruction threshold, while the second
scheme may recover the original data without problems. The
fact that share sizes can be of O(n) bits in contrast with
Ω(n log(n)) bits, makes our schemes more robust in this sense
when compared to the schemes in [3], [19]. See also [33,
Example VI] and Figure 2 for a comparison of some explicit
parameters when using Hermitian codes.
4) Finally, the strong security added in Section V to the
previous constructions also helps alleviate the storage require-
ments of perfect schemes, while keeping their component-wise
security.
B. Organization of the paper
After some preliminaries from the literature in Section II,
the results in this paper are organized as follows: In Section III,
we give two general constructions of communication efficient
secret sharing schemes based on linear codes, which are
inspired by the staircase presentation in [3]. Construction 1
aims at obtaining low communication overheads for sets of
size δ for one fixed value r ≤ δ ≤ n, while Construction
2 aims at obtaining low communication overheads for sets
of size δ, for any δ in an arbitrary set ∆ ⊆ [r, n], simul-
taneously, at the cost of a larger alphabet than Construction
3Construction Thresholds vs info rate Comm. efficiency Strong security Length vs field
Shamir [28] Optimal (perfect) No No n < q
[5], [37] Optimal (ramp) No No n < q
[8], [10] Near optimal No No n≫ q
[3], [19] Optimal Yes No n < q
Corollary 14 Near optimal Yes No n≫ q
[26], [37] Optimal No Yes ℓ+ n < q
[24] Near optimal No Yes ℓ+ n≫ q
Corollary 25 Optimal Yes Yes ℓ+ n < q
Corollary 26 Near optimal Yes Yes ℓ+ n≫ q
Fig. 1. Constructions in this work vs those in the literature, where ℓ/n is the information rate, thus n < ℓ+ n ≤ 2n.
1. In Section IV, we specialize the previous linear codes to
algebraic geometry codes, and see that the resulting schemes
have close to optimal communication overheads, while their
lengths are not bounded by the field size. In Section V, we
give special cases of Constructions 1 and 2 from Section
III that aim at achieving strong security. By specializing the
linear codes to MDS codes (such as Reed-Solomon codes), we
obtain the first construction of schemes with universal optimal
communication efficiency and optimal strong security at the
same time, at the cost of a large field size q (but still of the
order of n). On the other hand, by specializing the linear codes
to algebraic geometry codes, we obtain schemes with close to
optimal communication efficiency and strong security, while
having lengths not bounded by the field size.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Throughout the paper, q denotes a fixed prime power, and Fq
denotes the finite field with q elements. For positive integers
m and n, we denote by Fnq the vector space of row vectors of
length n over Fq , and we denote by Fm×nq the vector space
of m× n matrices with components in Fq .
We also denote [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and [m,n] = {m,m+
1, . . . , n− 1, n} if m ≤ n. For any vector x ∈ Fnq , any matrix
X ∈ Fm×nq and any set I ⊆ [n], we denote by xI and XI the
vector in F#Iq and the matrix in F
m×#I
q obtained by restricting
x to the components indexed by I and restricting X to the
columns indexed by I , respectively.
Sets C ⊆ Fnq and D ⊆ Fm×nq are called linear codes if
they are vector spaces over Fq. We denote by C⊥ the dual of
the code C with respect to the usual inner product in Fnq and,
for a set I ⊆ [n], we define the restriction of C and D to I ,
respectively, as the linear codes
CI = {cI | c ∈ C} ⊆ F#Iq and
DI = {DI | D ∈ D} ⊆ Fm×#Iq ,
and we define their shortened codes in I as the linear codes
CI = {cI | c ∈ C, c[n]\I = 0} ⊆ F#Iq and
DI = {DI | D ∈ D, D[n]\I = 0} ⊆ Fm×#Iq .
Finally, for random variables X and Y , we denote by H(X),
H(X |Y ) and I(X ;Y ) the entropy of X , conditional entropy
of X given Y , and the mutual information between X and Y ,
respectively, taking logarithms with some specified base. See
[11, Chapter 2].
B. Communication efficient secret sharing
We will consider the general definition of secret sharing
schemes from [19, Definition 1].
Definition 1 (Secret sharing schemes [19]). Let A be an
alphabet, and let n, ℓ, r and t be positive integers. An
(n, ℓ, r, t)A secret sharing scheme is a randomized encoding
function F : Aℓ −→ An (meaning that F (s) may take several
values in An with a given probability distribution, for each
s ∈ Aℓ) such that:
1) It has r-reconstruction: For any secret s ∈ Aℓ, if x =
F (s) and I ⊆ [n] is of size at least r, then
H(s|xI) = 0.
2) It has t-privacy: For any secret s ∈ Aℓ, if x = F (s) and
I ⊆ [n] is of size at most t, then
H(s|xI) = H(s).
We define the information rate of the scheme as ℓ/n.
This definition includes most of the classical proposals for
secret sharing schemes [3], [4], [5], [6], [8], [9], [10], [13],
[14], [17], [19], [21], [23], [24], [25], [26], [12], [28], [35],
[37]. As usual in the literature, we identify the i-th share xi
with the i-th party, hence the set [n] represents both the n
parties and their corresponding n shares.
Traditional efforts have been made in order to obtain
schemes where r is as low as possible, while keeping t and
ℓ large with respect to n. The obvious benefit of a low value
of r is that less parties need to be contacted, hence it is
expected that the amount of transmitted information to recover
the secret is lower. However, as noticed first in [35] and later in
[19], it is possible to recover the secret while transmitting less
information, as long as more parties are contacted. Observe
that, in the previous definition, when contacting r parties to
recover the secret, we use their whole shares. However if more
parties are contacted, then we may preprocess their shares so
that the overall amount of transmitted information is lower.
Formally, let I ⊆ [n] be such that #I ≥ r, let i ∈ I , and let
EI,i : A −→ BI,i be preprocessing functions, where #BI,i ≤
#A. The existence of decoding functions DI :
∏
i∈I BI,i −→
4Aℓ such that DI((EI,i(xi))i∈I) = s, where x = F (s), for all
s ∈ Aℓ, is equivalent to
H(s|(EI,i(xi))i∈I) = 0, (1)
for all s ∈ Aℓ. Observe that each preprocessing function EI,i
may depend on i and I . However, we will simply write E
when i and I are understood from the context.
We may now define the communication overhead and de-
coding bandwidth as follows:
Definition 2 (Communication overhead and decoding band-
width [19]). For a set I ⊆ [n] and preprocessing functions
satisfying (1), we define the communication overhead and
decoding bandwidth of I , respectively, as
CO(I) =
∑
i∈I
H(E(xi))−H(s), and
DB(I) =
∑
i∈I
H(E(xi)),
where logarithms in the entropy functions are with base #A.
Observe that, after preprocessing the i-th share, the amount
of information required to be transmitted by the i-th party is
H(E(xi)). Without assuming any processing of the overall
information in the variables E(xi), for i ∈ I , the total
transmitted information by the contacted parties is just the
sum of H(E(xi)) for i ∈ I . Hence the decoding bandwidth
is the total amount of information transmitted by the parties
indexed by I . Observe that
DB(I) ≥ H((E(xi))i∈I) ≥ H(s),
where the first inequality is a particular case of [11, Theorem
2.6.6] and the second inequality is a particular case of [11,
Exercise 2.4]. Therefore, the communication overhead mea-
sures the amount of overall extra information transmitted by
the contacted parties.
From now on, we will assume that the secret s is a uniform
random variable on Aℓ. To measure the quality of a scheme,
we will use the following bounds given in [19, Proposition 1]
and [19, Theorem 1]:
Proposition 3 ([19]). For a set I ⊆ [n] and given preprocess-
ing functions, the following bounds hold:
ℓ ≤ r − t, (2)
CO(I) ≥ ℓt
#I − t , (3)
DB(I) ≥ ℓ#I
#I − t . (4)
Observe that the definition of communication overhead in
[19, Definition 2] takes the values log(#BI,i) instead of the
smaller valuesH(E(xi)) (with base#A). However, the proofs
of the previous bounds work in the same way.
C. Secret sharing schemes based on linear codes
A classical approach to constructing secret sharing schemes
is by the so-called coset coding schemes. These were first
considered by Wyner in [36] for the problem of reliable and
secure communication over wire-tap channels, which may be
seen as secret sharing. A particular case is obtained when
choosing the family of cosets as the quotient vector space
of two linear codes over Fq, as considered in [10], [14], [21],
[23], [25], [38], and which generalize Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme [28]. The alphabet of these schemes is A = Fq .
Definition 4 (Nested coset coding schemes [10], [14], [21],
[23], [25], [38]). A nested linear code pair is a pair of linear
codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fnq . Choose a vector space W such that
C1 = C2⊕W and a vector space isomorphism ψ : Fℓq −→W ,
where ℓ = dim(C1/C2).
The nested coset coding scheme associated to C1 and C2 is
the secret sharing scheme F : Fℓq −→ Fnq defined by F (s) =
ψ(s) + c, for s ∈ Fℓq , where c is the uniform random variable
on C2.
To evaluate the reconstruction and privacy thresholds r and
t of a nested coset coding scheme, we need the concept of
minimum Hamming distance of a nested linear code pair C2 $
C1 ⊆ Fnq [14] and of a linear code C ⊆ Fnq , defined respectively
as follows:
d(C1, C2) = min{wt(c) | c ∈ C1, c /∈ C2}, and
d(C) = min{wt(c) | c ∈ C1, c 6= 0} = d(C, {0}),
where wt(c) = #{i ∈ [n] | ci 6= 0} is the Hamming weight
of the vector c ∈ Fnq .
The following result is proven in [14, Corollary 1.7]:
Lemma 5 ([14]). The nested coset coding scheme based on
the nested linear code pair C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fnq is an (n, ℓ, r, t)Fq
secret sharing scheme with ℓ = dim(C1/C2) and
r = n− d(C1, C2) + 1, (5)
t = d(C⊥2 , C⊥1 ) + 1. (6)
Remark 6. We will implicitly assume that C1 is not degener-
ate. That is, C1{i} 6= {0}, for every i ∈ [n]. If C1{i} = {0}
for some i ∈ [n], then the i-th share not only contains no
information about the secret, but added to any set of shares,
it does not increase the overall amount of information, hence
it may be removed.
III. COMMUNICATION EFFICIENT SECRET SHARING
SCHEMES BASED ON NESTED LINEAR CODES
We will now present a general construction of communica-
tion efficient secret sharing schemes based on linear codes that
is inspired by the constructions obtained independently in [3]
and [19, Section IV]. Our construction generalizes the previous
two. We will explain how at the end of each subsection.
We will present two versions of it. The first reduces com-
munication overheads by contacting any δ ≥ r shares for one
fixed value of δ, while the second reduces communication
overheads by contacting any δ ≥ r shares for all δ in an
arbitrary set ∆ ⊆ [r, n], hence achieving more flexibility.
5In the rest of the paper, the alphabet is A = Fαq , for a
positive integer α. The advantage of the first construction with
respect to the second is a significant smaller parameter α,
hence a significant smaller alphabet.
We will measure information taking logarithms in base q,
instead of qα. This only affects entropy and mutual informa-
tion by product with α (see [11, Lemma 2.1.2]).
A. Construction 1: Non-universal but small alphabet
Take linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ C ⊆ Fnq . The codes C1 and C2
will play the same role as in Subsection II-C. The staircase
structure of Construction 1 combined with the larger code C
makes it possible to recover the secret without downloading
some (depending on the parameters of C and C2) of the
random messages introduced by C2 (see Definition 4), hence
reducing the decoding bandwidth. This idea was discussed in
the original staircase constructions (see [3, Example 2]).
We now fix positive integers as follows (inequalities are
used to apply lower bounds on minimum Hamming distances):
1) ℓ = k1 − k2, where k1 = dim(C1) and k2 = dim(C2),
2) t ≤ d(C⊥2 , C⊥)− 1 and r ≥ n− d(C1, C2) + 1,
3) δ ≥ n− d(C, C2) + 1 such that δ ≥ r,
4) α = k − k2 ≥ ℓ, where k = dim(C).
Finally, fix a generator matrix of C of the form:
G =
(
G1
G3
)
∈ Fk×nq , and G1 =
(
G2
Gc
)
∈ Fk1×nq ,
where G2 ∈ Fk2×nq is a generator matrix of C2 and G1 ∈
Fk1×nq is a generator matrix of C1.
The secret space is the space of matrices Aℓ = Fα×ℓq (recall
that A = Fαq ). Now, for a secret S ∈ Fα×ℓq , divide it into two
subsecrets as follows:
S =
(
S1
S2
)
, S1 ∈ Fℓ×ℓq and S2 ∈ F(α−ℓ)×ℓq ,
where S = S1 in the case α = ℓ. Next, generate uniformly at
random a matrix
R =
(
R1
R2
)
∈ Fα×k2q , R1 ∈ Fℓ×k2q and R2 ∈ F(α−ℓ)×k2q ,
where R = R1 in the case α = ℓ. Finally, the i-th share, where
1 ≤ i ≤ n, is the i-th column of the matrix
C = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) =
(
R1 S1 S
T
2
R2 S2 0
)
G ∈ Fα×nq ,
which is a column vector ci ∈ Fα×1q , that is, a symbol in our
alphabet A = Fαq .
For a set I ⊆ [n] and i ∈ I , the corresponding preprocessing
function is
E : Fαq −→ Fℓq,
where E(ci) is obtained by restricting ci ∈ Fα×1q to its first
ℓ rows. We will need the following lemma, which is a direct
consequence of [22, Lemma 1] together with [15, Lemma 2],
as explained in the proof of [21, Theorem 4]. We recall the
proof for convenience of the reader.
Lemma 7 ([15], [21], [22]). If I ⊆ [n] is such that #I <
d(C⊥2 , C⊥), then C2I = CI .
Proof. Recall the notation and definitions of restricted and
shortened codes from Subsection II-A. The result [22, Lemma
1] states that
d(C⊥2 , C⊥) = min{#I | dim((C⊥2 )I/(C⊥)I) = 1}.
On the other hand, [15, Lemma 2] implies that
dim((C⊥2 )I/(C⊥)I) = dim(CI/C2I),
hence the result follows.
Now we may prove the main result of this subsection:
Theorem 1. The previous secret sharing scheme has informa-
tion rate ℓ/n, reconstruction r, privacy t and, for any I ⊆ [n]
with #I = δ, it holds that
CO(I) =
ℓ(δ − k + k2)
k − k2 , or DB(I) =
ℓδ
k − k2 .
Proof. We prove each item separately.
1) Reconstruction r: Take I ⊆ [n] of size at least r. From
(R2|S2|0)GI = (R2|S2)G1I
we obtain S2 by (5), since #I ≥ n − d(C1, C2) + 1. On the
other hand,
(R1|S1|ST2 )GI = (R1|S1)G1I + ST2 G3I .
By substracting ST2 G3I , we see that we only need to decode
(R1|S1)G1I .
Again, we obtain S1 by (5), since #I ≥ n − d(C1, C2) + 1.
Hence, we have obtained the whole secret S and proven that
H(S|XI) = 0.
2) Privacy t: Take I ⊆ [n] of size at most t. The
eavesdropper obtains
WI =
(
R1 S1 S
T
2
R2 S2 0
)
GI .
This random variable WI has support inside the linear code
CαI = {XGI | X ∈ Fα×kq } ⊆ Fα×#Iq .
Recall from [11, Theorem 2.6.4] that, if a random variable X
has support in the set X , then H(X) ≤ log(#X ). Hence
H(WI) ≤ log(#CαI ) = dim(CαI ) = α dim(CI).
On the other hand, using the analogous notation Cα2I for C2
instead of C, it holds that
H(WI | S) = log(#Cα2I) = dim(Cα2I) = α dim(C2I),
since, given a value of S, the variableWI is a uniform random
variable on an affine space obtained by translating the vector
space Cα2I . Hence we obtain that
I(S;WI) = H(WI)−H(WI | S)
≤ α(dim(CI)− dim(C2I)) = 0,
where the last equality follows from Lemma 7 since #I ≤
d(C⊥2 , C⊥)− 1.
63) Communication overhead and decoding bandwidth: Take
I ⊆ [n] of size δ. By definition, E(ci) is the i-th column of
the matrix
(R1|S1|ST2 )G ∈ Fℓ×nq ,
for each i ∈ I . Thus we may obtain S1 and ST2 by (5), since
#I ≥ n− d(C, C2) + 1, and hence we may obtain the whole
secret S. In other words, (1) is satisfied.
On the other hand, E(ci) is the uniform random variable
on
Cℓi = {XG{i} | X ∈ Fℓ×kq }.
Since C is not degenerate (see Remark 6), it follows that
Hqα(E(ci)) =
H(E(ci))
α
=
dim(Cℓi )
α
=
ℓ
α
.
Hence, we have that
DB(I) =
ℓ#I
α
=
ℓδ
k − k2 , and
CO(I) = DB(I)− ℓ = ℓ(δ − k + k2)
k − k2 .
Remark 8. Observe that H(E(ci)) = ℓ/α does not depend
on I nor i ∈ I . Therefore, any choice of δ available parties
may be contacted with the same communication costs and
moreover, the information transmission from these parties may
be performed in a balanced and parallel way.
We conclude by explaining how our Construction 1 gen-
eralizes that in [3, Subsec. III-A]. The construction in [19,
Section IV] is equivalent. Choose C2 $ C1 ⊆ C as nested
Reed-Solomon codes of dimensions k2, k1 and k, respectively.
Choose t = k2, r = k1 and δ = k. Observe that the
communication overhead for a set I ⊆ [n] of size δ in the
previous theorem coincides then with that in [3, Equation (4)],
which also coincides with the optimal value given by (3).
As is well-known, in this case we may take G2 ∈ Fk2×nq ,
G1 ∈ Fk1×nq and G ∈ Fk×nq as nested Vandermonde matrices.
The shares in our Construction 1 are given by the columns in(
R1 S1 S
T
2
R2 S2 0
)
G ∈ Fα×nq ,
whereas the shares in [3, Subsec. III-A] are given by the
columns in (
ST1 S
T
2 R1
DT R2 0
)
G ∈ Fα×nq ,
where D ∈ Fℓ×(α−ℓ)q is given by the last α − ℓ columns in
(ST | R1) ∈ Fℓ×kq .
We can see the equivalence of these two schemes as follows:
First, considering S1 or S
T
1 makes no difference, since both
are ℓ × ℓ matrices and contain the same part of the secret
matrix S. Second, the placement of the matrices R1 and R2
makes no difference, since any choice of consecutive rows of
a Vandermonde matrix can be seen again as a Vandermonde
matrix. For the same reason, the matrix D could be chosen as
any consecutive α− ℓ columns in (ST | R1), in particular, we
may choose D = ST2 as in our case.
These ways of restructuring the staircase construction work
for Reed-Solomon codes due to the fact that any choice of
consecutive rows of a Vandermonde matrices essentially gives
a new Reed-Solomon code. This is not the case for general
linear block codes. Hence it seems that our version of the
staircase construction is necessary in general.
B. Construction 2: Universal but large alphabet
In this subsection, we extend the universal constructions
from [3, Section VI] and [19, Section IV] to more general
schemes and evaluate their communication overhead and de-
coding bandwidth. The objective is to obtain schemes with
low communication overhead for all values of δ in a subset
∆ ⊆ [r, n], and not just one fixed value. The main requisites
for this construction are a larger alphabet than in Construction
1 and the existence of an appropriate sequence of nested
linear codes containing the main nested linear code pair, both
depending on ∆.
Take linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fnq and fix positive integers:
1) ℓ = k1 − k2, where k1 = dim(C1) and k2 = dim(C2),
2) r ≥ n− d(C1, C2) + 1.
Fix now an arbitrary subset ∆ = {δ1, δ2, . . . , δh} ⊆ [r, n],
where we assume that r = δh < δh−1 < . . . < δ2 < δ1 ≤ n.
Assume then that there exists a sequence of nested linear codes
C1 = C(h) $ C(h−1) $ . . . $ C(2) $ C(1) ⊆ Fnq ,
such that we may consider:
3) t ≤ d(C⊥2 , C(1)⊥)− 1 and δj ≥ n− d(C(j), C2) + 1,
4) αj = k
(j) − k2, where k(j) = dim(C(j)),
for j = 1, 2, . . . , h. Finally define
α = LCM(α1, α2, . . . , αh).
The intuition behind the choice of the larger codes C(j) is
the same as that of C in Construction 1 (see the beginning
of Subsection III-A). Again, we define our parameters by
inequalities in order to apply lower bounds on minimum
Hamming distances.
Take a generator matrix G2 ∈ Fk2×nq of C2 and a generator
matrix G1 ∈ Fk1×nq of C1 of the form
G1 =
(
G2
Gc
)
∈ Fk1×nq .
Recursively and decreasingly in j = h − 1, h − 2, . . . , 2, 1,
take a generator matrix G(j) ∈ Fk(j)×nq of C(j) of the form
G(j) =
(
G(j+1)
G
(j+1)
c
)
∈ Fk(j)×nq ,
where G(h) = G1. Next define the following positive integers,
which are analogous to those in [19, Equation (11)]:
pj =
{
ℓα
α1
if j = 1,
ℓα
αj
− ℓααj−1 if 1 < j ≤ h.
7The secret space is again Aℓ = Fα×ℓq with alphabet A =
Fαq , and we also generate uniformly at random a matrix R ∈
Fα×k2q . In this case, we divide S and R as follows:
S =

S1
S2
...
Sh
 , R =

R1
R2
...
Rh
 ,
where
Sj ∈ Fpj×ℓq and Rj ∈ Fpj×k2q ,
for j = 1, 2, . . . , h. Next, we define the matrices
M1 = (R1 S1 D1,1 D1,2 . . . D1,h−1),
M2 = (R2 S2 D2,1 D2,2 . . . 0),
M3 = (R3 S3 D3,1 D3,2 . . . 0),
...
...
Mh−1 = (Rh−1 Sh−1 Dh−1,1 0 . . . 0),
Mh = (Rh Sh 0 0 . . . 0),
where Mu ∈ Fpu×k(1)q , and where the matrices Du,v ∈
Fpu×(αh−v−αh−v+1)q are defined column-wise iteratively as
follows: For v = 1, 2, . . . , h − 1, the components of the v-
th column block
D1,v
D2,v
...
Dh−v,v
 ∈ Fℓα/αh−v×(αh−v−αh−v+1)q ,
are the components (after some fixed rearrangement) of the
matrix
(Sh−v+1|Dh−v+1,1|Dh−v+1,2| . . . |Dh−v+1,v−1),
whose size is ph−v+1 × αh−v+1. Observe that pj+1αj+1 =
(αj − αj+1)ℓα/αj . For convenience, we define the matrices
M ′j =

M1
M2
...
Mj
 ∈ Fℓα/αj×k(1)q , (7)
for j = 1, 2, . . . , h. Observe also that M ′h ∈ Fα×k
(1)
q since
ℓα/αh = α. Finally, the i-th share, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is the
i-th column of the matrix
C = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) =M
′
hG
(1) ∈ Fα×nq ,
which is a column vector ci ∈ Fα×1q , that is, a symbol in our
alphabet A = Fαq .
For j = 1, 2, . . . , h, a set I ⊆ [n] of size δj and i ∈ I , the
corresponding preprocessing function is
Ej : Fαq −→ Fℓα/αjq ,
where Ej(ci) is obtained by restricting ci ∈ Fαq to its first
ℓα/αj rows.
We may now establish the main result of this subsection:
Theorem 2. The previous secret sharing scheme has informa-
tion rate ℓ/n, reconstruction r, privacy t and, for any δj ∈ ∆
and any I ⊆ [n] with #I = δj , it holds that
CO(I) =
ℓ(δj − k(j) + k2)
k(j) − k2 , or DB(I) =
ℓδj
k(j) − k2 .
Proof. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 1:
1) Reconstruction r: Take I ⊆ [n] of size at least r. From
(Rh|Sh|0)GI = (Rh|Sh)G1I
we obtain Sh by (5), since #I ≥ n−d(C1, C2)+1. By defini-
tion, we have obtained Du,1, for u = 1, 2, . . . , h− 1. Hence,
substracting Dh−1,1(G
(h−1)
c )I from (Rh−1|Sh−1|Dh−1,1|
0)G
(1)
I as in the proof of Theorem 1, we may obtain
(Rh−1|Sh−1)G1I ,
and thus we obtain Sh−1 by (5), since #I ≥ n−d(C1, C2)+1.
Now, we have also obtained Du,2, for u = 1, 2, . . . , h − 2.
Proceeding iteratively in the same way, we see that we may
obtain all the matrices Sj , for j = 1, 2, . . . , h, and thus we
obtain the whole secret S. In particular, we have shown that
H(S|XI) = 0.
2) Privacy t: Take I ⊆ [n] of size at most t, and assume
that the eavesdropper obtains
WI =M
′
hG
(1)
I .
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we have that
I(S;WI) = H(WI)−H(WI | S)
≤ α(dim(C(1)I )− dim(C2I)) = 0,
where the last equality follows from Lemma 7, since #I ≤
d(C⊥2 , C(1)⊥)− 1.
3) Communication overhead and decoding bandwidth: Take
I ⊆ [n] of size δj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ h. By definition, Ej(ci)
is the i-th column of the matrix
M ′jG
(1) ∈ Fℓα/αj×nq ,
for each i ∈ I . As in the proof of Theorem 1, we may obtain
the matrix M ′j by (5), since #I ≥ n − d(C(j), C2) + 1. By
definition, the matrices S1, S2, . . . , Sj are contained inM
′
j . On
the other hand, the matrices D1,h−j , D2,h−j, . . . , Dj,h−j are
also contained in M ′j , and from them we obtain by definition
Sj+1 and Dj+1,1, Dj+1,2, . . . , Dj+1,h−j−1. Now, the matrices
D1,h−j−1, D2,h−j−1, . . . , Dj,h−j−1 are contained in M
′
j and
we also have Dj+1,h−j−1, hence we may obtain by definition
Sj+2 and Dj+2,1, Dj+2,2, . . . , Dj+2,h−j−2.
Continuing iteratively in this way, we may obtain all
S1, S2, . . . , Sh and hence the secret matrix S. In other words,
we have proven that the preprocessing functions satisfy (1).
Finally, Ej(ci) is the uniform random variable on
(C(j)i )ℓα/αj = {XG(j){i} | X ∈ Fℓα/αj×k
(j)
q }.
Since C(j) is not degenerate (see Remark 6), it follows that
Hqα(Ej(ci)) =
H(Ej(ci))
α
8=
dim((C(j)i )ℓα/αj )
α
=
ℓα
αj
· 1
α
=
ℓ
αj
.
Hence, we have that
DB(I) =
ℓ#I
αj
=
ℓδj
k(j) − k2 , and
CO(I) = DB(I)− ℓ = ℓ(δj − k
(j) + k2)
k(j) − k2
.
Remark 9. Observe, as in the previous subsection, that
H(Ej(ci)) = ℓ/αj depends on j (that is, on δ = δj) but
does not depend on I nor i ∈ I . Therefore, for a fixed
δ ∈ ∆, any δ available parties may be contacted with the same
communication costs, and the information transmission from
these parties may be performed in a balanced and parallel
way.
As in the previous subsection, our Construction 2 specializes
to the construction in [3, Section VI] and [19, Section IV] by
choosing C2 $ C1 and C(j) as nested Reed-Solomon codes of
dimensions k2, k1 and k
(j), respectively, and where t = k2,
r = k1 and δj = k
(j), for j = 1, 2, . . . , h. The communication
overhead for a set I ⊆ [n] of size δj in the previous theorem
coincides then with that in [3, Equation (4)], which also
coincides with the optimal value given by (3). The details
of how our Construction 2 extends that in [3, Section IV]
is analogous to those given at the end of Subsection III-A,
although the notation is now more cumbersome.
IV. COMMUNICATION EFFICIENT SECRET SHARING
SCHEMES BASED ON ALGEBRAIC GEOMETRY CODES
In this section, we will see that algebraic geometry codes
fit into the previous two constructions of communication
efficient secret sharing schemes, and allow to obtain schemes
with arbitrarily large length n while keeping the field size
q fixed and keeping low communication overhead, although
not necessarily optimal. When using appropriate sequences of
algebraic geometry codes, we will see that the difference with
the optimal case only depends on q, and not on the length
n. Hence, for a given defect with respect to the optimal case,
we only need to fix a suitable field size q, and then let n be
arbitrarily large.
Algebraic geometry codes fit in both Construction 1 and
Construction 2 since it is easy to find sequences of nested
algebraic geometry codes contained in and containing a given
one, as we will see. We refer to [18], [12, Section 12.7] and
[31] for general references on algebraic geometry codes. We
also remark here that generator matrices of algebraic geometry
codes (thus secret sharing schemes) can be explicitly and
efficiently constructed in many cases (for instance, the codes
in [30], [32], [33] or [16], [29]). A good brief explanation
of what is needed is given at the end of [31, Section 2.3].
Basically, one needs to obtain expressions of rational places
and Riemann-Roch spaces (see also Example 18), which we
define now.
Consider an irreducible projective curve X over Fq (which
in this paper means irreducible over the algebraic closure of
Fq) with algebraic function field F , and let g = g(X ) = g(F)
be its genus. Points in X correspond with places in F and we
say that they are rational if they are rational over Fq (have
coordinates over Fq). A divisor over X is a formal sum D =∑
P∈X µPP , for integers µP ∈ Z which are all zero except
for a finite number. The support of D is defined as {P ∈ X |
µP 6= 0}, and D is called rational if all points in its support
are rational. We define the degree of the rational divisor D
as deg(D) =
∑
P∈X µP ∈ Z. All divisors considered in this
paper (except in Appendix B) will be rational.
On the other hand, for divisors D =
∑
P∈X µPP and E =∑
P∈X λPP , we write D  E if µP ≤ λP , for all P ∈ X .
For an algebraic function f ∈ F , we define its divisor as
(f) =
∑
P∈X νP (f)P , where νP is the valuation at the point
P (see [31, Definition 1.1.12] or [18, Definition 2.15]). Hence
we may define the Riemann-Roch space (see [31, Definition
1.1.4] or [18, Definition 2.36]) of a divisor D as the vector
space over Fq given by:
L(D) = {f ∈ F | (f) +D  0}.
Finally, for rational divisorsD = P1+P2+· · ·+Pn andG over
X with disjoint supports and where the points Pi are pairwise
distinct, we define the corresponding algebraic geometry code
(see [31, Equation (2.3)] or [18, Definition 2.64]), or AG code
for short, as the following linear code:
C(D,G) = {(f(P1), f(P2), . . . , f(Pn)) | f ∈ L(G)} ⊆ Fnq .
We will need the following two well-known results on the
parameters of algebraic geometry codes. The first is the well-
known Goppa bound [31, Corollary 2.2.3 (a)] (see also [18,
Theorem 2.65]), together with its dual statement (see [31,
Theorem 2.2.7] and [31, Theorem 2.2.8]):
Lemma 10 (Goppa bound [18], [31]). If deg(G) < n and
C = C(D,G), or if 2g−2 < deg(G) < n and C = C(D,G)⊥,
then
d(C) ≥ n− dim(C)− g + 1.
The following lemma is [31, Corollary 2.2.3(b)] (see also
[18, Theorem 2.65]):
Lemma 11 ([18], [31]). If 2g − 2 < deg(G) < n, then
dim(C(D,G)) = deg(G)− g + 1.
A. Algebraic geometry codes for Constructions 1 and 2
Let the notation be as in the beginning of this section. In the
following two propositions, we gather the parameters obtained
in Constructions 1 and 2 when using AG codes. We start
presenting the result for Construction 1. We omit its proof,
since it is analogous and simpler to that of Construction 2.
Proposition 12. Let X be an irreducible projective curve over
Fq, let P1, P2, . . . , Pn be pairwise distinct rational points on
X , and let G2, G1 and G be rational divisors on X whose
supports do not contain the previous points P1, P2, . . . , Pn,
and such that
G2  G1  G, and
2g − 2 < deg(G2) < deg(G1) ≤ deg(G) < n.
9The secret sharing scheme in Construction 1 using the linear
codes
C2 = C(D,G2), C1 = C(D,G1), C = C(D,G),
where D = P1+P2+ · · ·+Pn, has the following parameters:
1) Information rate ℓ/n = (deg(G1)− deg(G2))/n,
2) Reconstruction r = deg(G1) + 1,
3) Privacy t = deg(G2)− 2g + 1,
and for any I ⊆ [n] of size δ = deg(G) + 1, it holds that
CO(I) =
ℓ(t+ 2g)
δ − t− 2g , or DB(I) =
ℓδ
δ − t− 2g .
We now present and prove the analogous result for Con-
struction 2. For simplicity, we gather the main assumptions in
the following paragraph:
Assumptions (A): Let X be an irreducible projective curve
over Fq and let P1, P2, . . . , Pn be pairwise distinct rational
points on X . Let 2g < r ≤ n, let ∆ ⊆ [r, n] with elements
r = δh < δh−1 < . . . < δ2 < δ1 ≤ n, and let G2, G1 =
G(h), G(h−1), . . . , G(2), G(1) be rational divisors on X whose
supports do not contain the previous points P1, P2, . . . , Pn.
Define D = P1 + P2 + · · ·+ Pn and assume also that
G2  G1 = G(h)  G(h−1)  . . .  G(2)  G(1),
2g − 2 < deg(G2) < deg(G1) = r − 1 < n
and deg(G(j)) = δj − 1, for j = 1, 2, . . . , h.
Proposition 13. If the assumptions (A) hold, then the secret
sharing scheme in Construction 2 using the linear codes
C2 = C(D,G2), C1 = C(D,G1), C(j) = C(D,G(j)),
for j = 1, 2, . . . , h, has the following parameters:
1) Information rate ℓ/n = (deg(G1)− deg(G2))/n,
2) Reconstruction r = deg(G1) + 1,
3) Privacy t = deg(G2)− 2g + 1,
and, for any δ ∈ ∆ and any I ⊆ [n] of size δ, it holds that
CO(I) =
ℓ(t+ 2g)
δ − t− 2g , or DB(I) =
ℓδ
δ − t− 2g .
Proof. It follows from combining Theorem 2, Lemma 10 and
Lemma 11. Observe that, since G2  G1 and G(j)  G(j−1),
then L(G2) ⊆ L(G1) and L(G(j)) ⊆ L(G(j−1)) and hence
C2 ⊆ C1 and C(j) ⊆ C(j−1), for j = 2, 3, . . . , h, where inclu-
sions are strict due to Lemma 11, since 2g − 2 < deg(G2) <
deg(G1) < deg(G
(j)) < n, for j = 1, 2, . . . , h− 1.
Observe that, if r ≤ δ < δ′ ≤ n, then
ℓ(t+ 2g)
δ − t− 2g >
ℓ(t+ 2g)
δ′ − t− 2g ,
and therefore the communication overhead decreases as the
number of contacted shares δ increases, as expected.
As remarked in Section I, we can see that the defect with
respect to the optimal case is only on the privacy thresholds,
meaning that if ℓ and r are given, t = r−ℓ−2g differs from the
optimal value r−ℓ by 2g, but the decoding bandwidths present
the same improvement on r as the optimal constructions in [3],
[19] (see also Example 17):
DB(I) =
ℓδ
ℓ+ (δ − r) , (8)
for any δ ∈ ∆ and any set I of size δ. Observe that, if t = r−ℓ
is optimal, then the optimal value given by (4) coincides with
that in (8) when substituting t by r − ℓ.
For more concrete constructions and existential proofs and
to obtain the largest possible lengths, it is usual to consider
the so-called one-point algebraic geometry codes. These are
AG codes where the support of the divisor G is constituted
by a single point. That is, G = µQ for some rational point
Q ∈ X and integer µ ∈ Z. It holds that deg(G) = µ. The
next consequence follows:
Corollary 14. If there exists an irreducible projective curve X
over Fq with N ≥ n+1 rational points and genus g, then for
any 0 ≤ t < r ≤ n with r − t > 2g and any ∆ ⊆ [r, n] with
r ∈ ∆, there exists a secret sharing scheme with information
rate ℓ/n = (r − t − 2g)/n, reconstruction r, privacy t and,
for any δ ∈ ∆ and any I ⊆ [n] of size δ, it holds that
CO(I) =
ℓ(t+ 2g)
δ − t− 2g , or DB(I) =
ℓδ
δ − t− 2g .
Moreover, the scheme can be explicitly constructed if ex-
pressions of the rational places and Riemann-Roch spaces
corresponding to X are known, due to the description in
Proposition 13.
Proof. Take pairwise distinct rational points Q,P1, P2, . . . ,
Pn ∈ X , and define µ2 = t + 2g − 1, µ1 = r − 1 and
µ(j) = δj − 1, for j = 1, 2, . . . , h, and where the elements
in ∆ are r = δh < δh−1 < . . . < δ2 < δ1 ≤ n. Observe
that t ≥ 0 implies that µ2 > 2g − 2, r > t + 2g implies
that µ1 > µ2, and δ1 ≤ n implies that µ(1) < n. Defining
G2 = µ2Q, G1 = µ1Q and G
(j) = µ(j)Q, for j = 1, 2, . . . , h,
the assumptions in the previous proposition are satisfied and
thus the result follows. Finally, as remarked at the beginning
of this section, the requirements to explicitly construct the
corresponding schemes are explained at the end of [31, Section
2.3].
Remark 15. Observe that the parameters in the previous
corollary are close to the optimal values, in view of Lemma
3, whenever the genus g is close to 0. As a particular case,
taking curves of genus g = 0 (such as the projective line,
which is the case of Reed-Solomon codes), we obtain schemes
with optimal parameters, which are the ones obtained in [3]
and [19].
In this way, we have reduced the problem of finding long
secret sharing schemes with low decoding bandwidth to the
well studied problem of finding irreducible projective curves
with many rational points and low genus [20], [31], [34].
In the next subsection, we will give a well-known explicit
family of algebraic geometry codes and apply it to the previous
corollary.
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t 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
r/n 0.50 0.56 0.63 0.69 0.75 0.81 0.88 0.94 1
DB/n 0.50 0.53 0.57 0.62 0.67 0.73 0.80 0.89 1
t – – – 0 4 8 12 16 20
r/n – – – 0.69 0.75 0.81 0.88 0.94 1
DB/n – – – 0.62 0.67 0.73 0.80 0.89 1
Fig. 2. Values of t, r/n and DB/n, for δ = n, using Reed-Solomon codes
of length n = 16 and Hermitian codes of length n = 64, respectively, both
with q = 16.
B. Using Hermitian codes
In this subsection, we apply Corollary 14 to the case where
X is a Hermitian curve. These curves give the so-called
Hermitian codes (see [30], [32], [33, Section VI] or [17,
Section VI]), which are not MDS but are considered in many
cases in practice to be better than Reed-Solomon codes for
the same information rate, since they are considerably longer
and still have a large minimum Hamming distance (See [33,
Section VI] for a discussion).
Assume that the field size is a perfect square q = u2, and
consider the projective plane curve X defined by xu+1−yuz−
yzu = 0. This curve is called a Hermitian curve and has
N = u3 + 1 =
√
q3 + 1 rational points, and genus
g = g(X ) = u(u− 1)
2
=
q −√q
2
.
Specializing Corollary 14 to these curves, we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 16. Let X be a Hermitian curve over Fq , where
q = u2. Let Q,P1, P2, . . . , Pu3 be its N = u
3 + 1 rational
points, let u2−u+2 ≤ n ≤ u3 and defineD = P1+P2+· · ·+
Pn. Let 0 ≤ t < r ≤ n be such that r− t > 2g = u2 − u, and
let ∆ ⊆ [r, n] with r ∈ ∆. The corresponding secret sharing
scheme in Corollary 14 constructed using X has information
rate ℓ/n = (r− t− q+√q)/(√q3), reconstruction r, privacy
t and, for any δ ∈ ∆ and any I ⊆ [n] of size δ, it holds that
CO(I) =
ℓ(t+ q −√q)
δ − t− q +√q , or DB(I) =
ℓδ
δ − t− q +√q .
These schemes can be explicitly constructed using explicit
descriptions of the generator matrices of the involved Hermi-
tian codes, which can be found in [30], [32].
We now give an example of attainable parameters and an
explicit toy example of Construction 1 using Hermitian codes:
Example 17. Take the field Fq with q = 16, and let the
information rate be 12 .
The maximum length obtained by a Reed-Solomon code is
n = 16. Then ℓ = 8 and r− t = 8. In this case, the decoding
bandwidth for sets of size δ is
DB =
8d
8 + (δ − r) =
δ
1 + (δ − r)/8 .
The maximum length obtained by a Hermitian code is n =
64, with genus g = 6. Then ℓ = 32 and r − t = ℓ+ 2g = 44.
In this case, the decoding bandwidth for sets of size δ is
DB =
32d
32 + (δ − r) =
δ
1 + (δ − r)/32 .
Fig. 2 shows several values of t, r/n and DB/n, for δ =
n, when using Reed-Solomon codes and Hermitian codes of
lengths n = 16 and n = 64, respectively. As observed in
Subsection IV-A, the defect with the optimal case is only on t,
while the decoding bandwidths present the same improvements
with respect to r.
Example 18. We will use here the worked out example of
Hermitian codes from [32]. Let q = 4 and F4 = {0, 1, ω, ω}
with ωω = ω + ω = 1. We may consider that the Hermitian
curve has equation x3 + y3 + z3 = 0 after a transformation,
and it has the 9 rational points Q = (0, 1, 1), P1 = (1, 0, ω),
P2 = (1, 0, ω), P3 = (1, 0, 1), P4 = (1, ω, 0), P5 = (1, ω, 0),
P6 = (1, 1, 0), P7 = (0, ω, 1), P8 = (0, ω, 1). In such case,
the genus is g = 1 and the codes C(D,µQ), for µ = 1, 2, 3, 4,
where D =
∑8
i=1 Pi, are µ-dimensional and generated by the
first µ rows of the matrix
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ω ω 1 ω ω 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 ω ω
ω ω 1 ω ω 1 0 0
 .
Choose now µ2 = 2, µ1 = 3 and µ = 4. Then by Proposition
12, n = 8, t = 1, r = 4, ℓ = 1, δ = 5, and α = µ− µ2 = 2.
To obtain the shares of the corresponding scheme, we need to
multiply the previous matrix on the left by(
r11 r12 s11 s21
r21 r22 s21 0
)
,
where the secret is (s11, s21)
T ∈ F2×14 . For instance, the first
share is
(r11 + r12ω + s21ω, r21 + r22ω)
T ∈ F2×14 .
When downloading δ = 4 shares, we only need to download
the first of the two components of each share. The communi-
cation overheads for sets of sizes r and δ are then
CO(r) = 3, and CO(δ) = 3/2.
Hence communication overheads are reduced by half when
contacting δ = 4 shares instead of r = 3.
C. Asymptotic behaviour for a fixed finite field
In this subsection, we use the secret sharing schemes based
on one-point AG codes in Corollary 14 to obtain sequences of
schemes that are communication efficient and whose lengths
go to infinity while being defined over a fixed finite field Fq.
We treat only Construction 1 for simplicity on the asymptotic
parameters, being Construction 2 analogous. In this way, we
show that the defect in the decoding bandwidth in the schemes
in Corollary 14 with respect to the optimal values given by
(4) depends only on the field size q and not on the length n,
meaning that, for a given defect, we may fix a suitable field
size, and let the lengths be arbitrarily large.
As observed in Remark 15, Corollary 14 states the exis-
tence of communication efficient schemes depending on the
existence of irreducible projective curves X over Fq with
as many rational points and small genus as possible (and
11
explicit schemes can be constructed if data about X is known).
Therefore, it will be essential to make use of Ihara’s constant
[20]
A(q) = lim sup
g(X )→∞
N(X )
g(X ) , (9)
where the limit is taken over all irreducible projective curves
X over Fq of genus g(X ) > 0, and where N(X ) denotes the
number of rational points in X . Serre’s lower bound [27] and
the Drinfeld-Vla˘dut¸ upper bound [34] state that
c log(q) ≤ A(q) ≤ √q − 1, (10)
for a constant c > 0 that does not depend on q, and where the
equality A(q) =
√
q−1 holds if q is a perfect square [20]. See
also [18, Section 2.9], [12, Section 12.7.7] and [31, Chapter 7]
for more details on Ihara’s constant and asymptotic behaviour
of AG codes.
We will consider sequences of irreducible projective curves
(Xi)∞i=1 such that N(Xi) −→∞ and
lim
i→∞
N(Xi)
g(Xi) = A(q). (11)
We may now state the following asymptotic consequence
of Corollary 14:
Proposition 19. For any 0 ≤ T < R< D ≤ 1 with R− T >
2/A(q), there exists a strictly increasing sequence of positive
integers (ni)
∞
i=1 and a sequence of secret sharing schemes
defined over Fq such that, for large enough i, the i-th scheme
has length ni and the following parameters:
1) Information rate ℓi/ni ≥ L = R − T − 2/A(q),
2) Reconstruction ri = ⌈Rni⌉,
3) Privacy ti = ⌊Tni⌋,
and for any set I ⊆ [ni] of size δi = ⌈Dni⌉, it holds that
LD
D − T ≤ DB(I) ≤
LD
D − T − 2/A(q) .
As in Corollary 14, each scheme in the sequence can be
explicitly constructed if expressions of the rational places and
Riemann-Roch spaces are known.
Proof. Take a sequence of irreducible projective curves
(Xi)∞i=1 satisfying N(Xi) −→∞ and (11). Let 2g(Xi) + 2 ≤
ni ≤ N(Xi)− 1 be such that limi→∞ ni/g(Xi) = A(q). The
parameters ri = ⌈Rni⌉ and ti = ⌊Tni⌋ satisfy ri − ti >
2g(Xi) for i large enough. The result then follows by defining
divisors and one-point AG codes as in the proof of Corollary
14.
Remark 20. Observe that (10) implies that, as q −→ ∞,
it holds that 2/A(q) −→ 0, and thus by Proposition 19, it
follows that the asymptotic decoding bandwidth can be as
close to the optimal value as wanted for large enough finite
fields. Formally, for a fixed ε > 0, we may fix q such that
the difference with the optimal value is ≤ ε, and then let the
lengths be arbitrary large.
Observe also that the lengths of the schemes in the previous
proposition are lower bounded by (twice) the genus of the
corresponding curves. We leave open how to find more flexible
(shorter) schemes.
We conclude this subsection by observing that the expo-
nentiating parameter α grows linearly with n in Construction
1 when using algebraic geometry codes. This leads to the
discussion in item 2 in Subsection I-A on the share sizes of the
schemes in [3], [19] and those based on algebraic geometry
codes.
Fix an information rate 0 < L < 1. Construction 1 in [3]
requires α = δ − t = λn, where L < λ < 1 since δ − t >
r − t = ℓ. On the other hand, Construction 1 based on a
sequence of irreducible projective curves attaining equality in
(9) satisfies α = λn for large lengths, where L + 2/A(q) <
λ < 1. Hence the shares are of size at least nλn, that is
Ω(n log(n)) bits, in the first case, whereas they are of size
O(qλn), that is O(n) bits, in the second case.
D. Using Garcı´a-Stichtenoth’s second tower
In this subsection, we apply Proposition 19 to the so-
called second tower of projective curves (Xi)∞i=1 introduced
by Garcı´a and Stictenoth in [16]. This sequence of projective
curves is defined over a field whose size q is a perfect
square and satisfies (11), where A(q) =
√
q − 1, hence being
asymptotically optimal.
Moreover, they are explicitly defined in [16], and there are
efficient algorithms to construct the generator matrices of the
corresponding algebraic geometry codes, as shown in [29] (the
i-th algorithm has complexity O(n3i log(ni)
3) or O(n3i ) in
some cases, being ni the length of the i-th code [29, Theorem
7]). We recall here that this sequence of codes is one of the
few explicitly known sequences that has better asymptotic
parameters than the existencial Gilbert-Varshamov bound.
Assume again that the field size is a perfect square q =
u2, and consider Garcı´a and Stictenoth’s second tower of
projective curves (Xi)∞i=1 from [16]. The i-th curve Xi has
N(Xi) > ui(u− 1) rational points, and its genus is given by
g(Xi) =
{
(u
i
2 − 1)2 if i is even,
(u
i+1
2 − 1)(u i−12 − 1) if i is odd.
Specializing Proposition 19 to this tower of curves, we
obtain the following result:
Proposition 21. For any finite field Fq whose size q is a
perfect square, and for any 0 ≤ T < R< D ≤ 1 with
R−T > 2/(√q−1), there exists a strictly increasing sequence
of positive integers (ni)
∞
i=1 and a sequence of secret sharing
schemes defined over Fq such that, for large enough i, the i-th
scheme has length ni and the following parameters:
1) Information rate ℓi/ni ≥ L = R− T − 2/(√q − 1),
2) Reconstruction ri = ⌈Rni⌉,
3) Privacy ti = ⌊Tni⌋,
and for any set I ⊆ [ni] of size δi = ⌈Dni⌉, it holds that
LD
D − T ≤ DB(I) ≤
LD
D − T − 2/(√q − 1) .
Moreover, generator matrices for the i-th scheme can be con-
structed explicitly with complexity O(n3i log(ni)
3) following
the algorithm in [29, Subsection IV-A].
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Proof. The proof is exactly the same as that of Proposition 19,
although using Garcı´a and Stictenoth’s second tower of pro-
jective curves, as described in this subsection. We recall that,
according to [29, Theorem 7], to construct generator matrices
for the i-th scheme with the mentioned complexity, we need
to choose the length of the i-th scheme as ni = u
i(u − 1),
which satisfies the constraints in the proof of Proposition 19.
Recall also the definitions of the parameters for the codes
corresponding to the i-th scheme from the proof of Corollary
14.
V. STRONGLY SECURE AND COMMUNICATION EFFICIENT
SCHEMES
In this section, we see how to obtain strongly secure
secret sharing schemes as in [21, Section 4] that are also
communication efficient at the same time. As explained in
Section I, strongly secure schemes were introduced in [37]
and allow to keep components of the secret safe even when
more than t shares are eavesdropped. This feature makes
them behave like perfect schemes in terms of component-wise
security, while having the security and efficiency in storage of
ramp schemes. In this sense, strongly secure schemes provide
a strict improvement on ramp schemes and an interesting
alternative to perfect schemes.
A. Strong security
Although strongly secure secret sharing schemes were in-
troduced in [37], we will use the extended definition from [21,
Definition 18]:
Definition 22 ([21], [37]). Let σ ∈ N. We say that a secret
sharing scheme F : Aℓ −→ An is σ-strongly secure if, for all
I ⊆ [ℓ] and all J ⊆ [n] with #I +#J ≤ σ + 1, it holds that
I(sI ;xJ ) = 0,
where s denotes the random variable corresponding to the
secret in Aℓ, and x = F (s) denotes the random variable
corresponding to the shares in An.
Observe that, if a scheme is σ-strongly secure and σ′ ≤ σ,
then it is also σ′-strongly secure. Hence it is convenient to
define the maximum strength of a scheme F : Aℓ −→ An as
σmax(F ) = max{σ ∈ N | F is σ-strongly secure}.
Observe that the reconstruction and privacy threshold values
are also monotonous. Hence, we define for convenience the
minimum reconstruction and maximum privacy thresholds,
respectively, of a scheme F : Aℓ −→ An as
rmin(F ) = min{r ∈ N | F has r-reconstruction}, and
tmax(F ) = max{t ∈ N | F has t-privacy}.
We next give upper bounds on σmax(F ) in terms of rmin(F )
and tmax(F ) that follow easily from the definitions. They
will allow us to claim the optimality of the construction in
Corollary 25, which we will present in Subsection V-C.
Lemma 23. For a secret sharing scheme F : Aℓ −→ An , it
holds that
σmax(F ) ≤ tmax(F ) + ℓ− 1 ≤ rmin(F )− 1. (12)
Proof. Take I = [ℓ]. By definition, if the scheme has σ-strong
securiry, then it holds that I(sI ;xJ ) = 0 for any J ⊆ [n]
of size σ + 1 − ℓ. Hence the scheme F has (σ + 1 − ℓ)-
privacy. Since tmax(F ) is the maximum privacy threshold, it
holds by definition that σmax(F )+1−ℓ ≤ tmax(F ), hence the
first bound follows. The second bound follows directly from
(2).
Observe that a strongly secure secret sharing scheme not
only satisfies that σmax(F ) − ℓ + 1 is a privacy threshold
but, in addition, if more than σmax(F ) − ℓ + 1 shares are
leaked and some information about the secret is obtained by
an eavesdropper, we are guaranteed that no information about
any collection of µ components of the secret s are leaked if
the number of leaked shares is at most σmax(F ) − µ + 1,
for µ ≤ ℓ. In particular, no information about any single
component si ∈ A of the secret is leaked if at most σmax(F )
shares are obtained by the eavesdropper.
In the optimal case σmax(F ) = tmax(F ) + ℓ − 1 =
rmin(F )−1, if tmax(F )+µ shares are eavesdropped, for some
µ > 0, then no information is leaked about any collection of
ℓ − µ components of s, µ ≤ ℓ. Observe that in particular,
no information is leaked about any component si ∈ A if
rmin(F ) − 1 shares are eavesdropped, which is the same
amount as in an optimal perfect scheme. However, the scheme
F : Aℓ −→ An is also an optimal ramp scheme, hence having
the component-wise security advantages of perfect schemes
and the security and efficiency in storage of ramp schemes, as
explained at the beginning of this section.
B. Massey-type secret sharing schemes
We will consider Construction 2 combined with Massey-
type secret sharing schemes, which are a modification of the
schemes in [23]. We omit the details regarding Construction
1 for brevity, since they are analogous.
To consider strong security, we will see the i-th component
of the secret S ∈ Fα×ℓq as its i-th column Si ∈ Fα×1q , for
i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, which is a symbol in the alphabet A = Fαq .
The idea behing the Massey construction is to use codes
obtained by restricting longer ones to certain coordinates. In
our case, we will fix throughout the section positive integers
h, ℓ ≤ n, and linear codes
D1 = D(h) $ D(h−1) $ . . . $ D(2) $ D(1) ⊆ Fℓ+nq . (13)
We may now define our modified Massey-type construction
of secret sharing schemes as follows (recall the definition of
restricted and shortened codes from Subsection II-A):
Definition 24. Assume that the codes in (13) satisfy the
following:
1) D1[ℓ] = Fℓq , and
2) dim(D(1)[ℓ+1,ℓ+n]) = dim(D(1)).
Define now the codes
C2 = D[ℓ+1,ℓ+n]1 $ C1 = D1[ℓ+1,ℓ+n], and
C(j) = D(j)[ℓ+1,ℓ+n],
(14)
13
for j = 1, 2, . . . , h. We say that the secret sharing scheme
in Construction 2 is of Massey-type if it is constructed using
such linear codes
C2 $ C1 = C(h) $ C(h−1) $ . . . $ C(2) $ C(1) ⊆ Fnq .
The following is the main result of this section. It states
that the secret sharing scheme in Construction 2 based on the
codes in the previous definition not only has the properties
of the scheme in Theorem 2, but in addition we may give a
lower bound on its strong security that will be useful in the
next subsections. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 3. Let ∆ ⊆ [n] with elements 0 < δh < δh−1 <
. . . < δ2 < δ1 ≤ n, and assume that the codes in (14) satisfy
that
δj ≥ n− d(C(j), C2) + 1,
for j = 1, 2, . . . , h. Then the secret sharing scheme F :
Aℓ −→ An from Construction 2 using the codes in (14)
has information rate ℓ/n, reconstruction r = δh, privacy
t = d(C⊥2 , C(1)⊥) − 1 and communication overheads as in
Theorem 2, where it holds that k2 = dim(C2) = dim(C1)− ℓ
and k(j) = dim(D(j)) = dim(C(j)), for j = 1, 2, . . . , h. In
addition, it holds that
σmax(F ) ≥ min{d(G⊥i ) | 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ} − 1,
where we define the linear codes
Gi = D[ℓ+n]\{i}1 ,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
C. Optimal strongly secure and communication efficient
schemes based on MDS codes
In this subsection, we give the first construction of a ramp
secret sharing scheme that has optimal threshold parameters
with respect to its information rate (2), optimal strong security
in the sense of (12) and optimal communication efficiency
in the sense of (3) and (4). The result is a consequence of
Theorem 3:
Corollary 25. Fix positive integers n, r and t such that 0 ≤
t < r ≤ n, define ℓ = r− t, and let ∆ ⊆ [r, n] with r ∈ ∆. If
ℓ+n ≤ q, then we may choose the codes in (13) as MDS codes
with dim(D1) = r, and satisfying the conditions in Definition
24 and Theorem 3.
In such case, the secret sharing scheme F : Aℓ −→ An
from Construction 2 using the codes in (14) has information
rate ℓ/n, reconstruction r, privacy t (hence ℓ = r−t is optimal
by (2)), optimal decoding bandwidth (meaning equality in (3)
and (4)) for any δ ∈ ∆ and any set I ⊆ [n] of size δ, and in
addition it has maximum strength
σmax(F ) = t+ ℓ− 1 = r − 1,
which is optimal by (12). In particular, it holds that
I(SI ;XJ ) = 0,
for all I ⊆ [ℓ] and all J ⊆ [n] with #I +#J ≤ r.
Proof. First if ℓ + n ≤ q, then we may take the codes in
(13) as nested Reed-Solomon codes, which are MDS, with
dim(D1) = r and satisfying the conditions in Definition 24
and Theorem 3.
Now by Theorem 3, we only need to show that d(G⊥i ) ≥
r, for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. Since D1 is MDS, the linear code Gi
is again MDS, which implies in turn that G⊥i is MDS. The
length of this latter code is ℓ + n − 1 and its dimension is
dim(G⊥i ) = dim(D⊥1 ) = ℓ+ n− r, therefore d(G⊥i ) = r, and
we are done.
Observe that the requirement on the field size (q ≥ ℓ + n)
is the same as in previous optimal strongly secure schemes
[26], and the expansion of the alphabet size is the same as in
previous optimal communication efficient schemes [3], [19].
For each component of the secret Si ∈ A, the scheme
behaves as an optimal perfect scheme (as Shamir’s scheme),
and for the entire secret S ∈ Aℓ, it behaves as an optimal
ramp scheme. Therefore, it has the component-wise security
advantages of the first and the security and storage efficiency
of the second, while being communication efficient at the same
time.
D. Strongly secure and communication efficient schemes
based on algebraic geometry codes
In this subsection, we extend Corollary 25 by using general
AG codes. In this way, we overcome the limitation on the field
size in the previous construction, at the cost of near optimality.
Analogous strongly secure schemes based on AG codes, but
without communication efficiency, have been given in [24].
We give a construction analogous to that in Corollary 14:
Corollary 26. If there exists an irreducible projective curve
X over Fq with N ≥ ℓ + n+ 1 rational points and genus g,
then for any 0 ≤ t < r ≤ n with ℓ = r − t − 2g, and any
∆ ⊆ [r, n] with r ∈ ∆, there exists a secret sharing scheme
F : Aℓ −→ An with information rate ℓ/n, reconstruction r,
privacy t and, for any δ ∈ ∆ and any I ⊆ [n] of size δ, it
holds that
CO(I) =
ℓ(t+ 2g)
δ − t− 2g , or DB(I) =
ℓδ
δ − t− 2g .
In addition, the scheme has maximum strength
σmax(F ) ≥ t+ ℓ− 1 = r − 2g − 1.
In particular, it holds that
I(SI ;XJ) = 0,
for all I ⊆ [ℓ] and all J ⊆ [n] with #I+#J ≤ t+ℓ = r−2g.
Moreover, the scheme can be explicitly constructed if ex-
pressions of the rational places and Riemann-Roch spaces
corresponding to X are known.
Proof. As in the proof of Corollary 14, take pairwise distinct
rational points Q,P1, P2, . . . , Pℓ+n ∈ X , and define µ1 =
r−1 and µ(j) = δj−1, for j = 1, 2, . . . , h, where the elements
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in ∆ are r = δh < δh−1 < . . . < δ2 < δ1 ≤ n. Define
E = P1 + P2 + · · ·+ Pℓ+n, and the AG codes
D1 = C(E, µ1Q), and D(j) = C(E, µ(j)Q),
for j = 1, 2, . . . , h. Since 2g − 2 < µ1 < n, it holds that
dim(D1) = µ1−g+1 ≥ ℓ by Lemma 11. Hence by rearrang-
ing the points Pi if necessary, we may assume that D1[ℓ] = Fℓq.
Moreover, we have that D(1)[ℓ+1,ℓ+n] = C(D,µ(1)Q), where
D = Pℓ+1 + Pℓ+2 + · · ·+ Pℓ+n. Thus
dim(D(1)[ℓ+1,ℓ+n]) = dim(D(1))
by Lemma 11 since 2g − 2 < µ(1) < n < ℓ + n. Therefore
the assumptions in Definition 24 are satisfied.
On the other hand, the codes in (14) are given by
C2 = C(D,µ1Q− P1 − P2 − · · · − Pℓ) $ C1 = C(D,µ1Q),
and C(j) = C(D,µ(j)Q),
for j = 1, 2, . . . , h, where deg(µ1Q− P1 − P2 − · · · − Pℓ) =
µ1− ℓ = t+2g−1. Therefore, the assumptions in Proposition
13 are satisfied and hence the result follows, except for the
claim on the maximum strength, which we now prove. For a
fixed i ∈ [ℓ], observe that
Gi = C(P1 + P2 + · · ·+ P̂i + · · ·+ Pℓ+n, µ1Q− Pi).
Since 2g− 2 < µ1− 1 < ℓ+n− 1, it follows that dim(Gi) =
µ1 − g by Lemma 11. Therefore, it holds that
d(G⊥i ) ≥ µ1 − 2g + 1
by Lemma 10. Hence the scheme has maximum strength
σmax(F ) ≥ µ1 − 2g = r − 2g − 1 = t+ ℓ− 1
by Theorem 3, and we are done.
In the same way as in Subsection IV-C, we may give the
following asymptotic consequence, which shows again that the
defect in the decoding bandwidth with respect to the optimal
case depends only on the field size q and not on the length n.
Again, this means that we may fix a suitable field size for a
given defect, and then let the lengths be arbitrary large.
Corollary 27. For any 0 ≤ T < R< D ≤ 1 with R − T >
4/A(q), there exists a strictly increasing sequence of positive
integers (ni)
∞
i=1 and a sequence of secret sharing schemes
defined over Fq such that, for large enough i, the i-th scheme
has length ni and the following parameters:
1) Information rate ℓi/ni ≥ L = R − T − 4/A(q),
2) Reconstruction ri = ⌈Rni⌉,
3) Privacy ti = ⌊Tni⌋,
and for any set I ⊆ [ni] of size δi = ⌈Dni⌉, it holds that
LD
D − T ≤ DB(I) ≤
LD
D − T − 4/A(q) .
In addition, the i-th scheme has maximum strength
σi = ti + ℓi − 1.
As in Corollary 14, each scheme in the sequence can be
explicitly constructed if expressions of the rational places and
Riemann-Roch spaces are known.
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Proposition 19.
However, we now need that ℓi + ni + 1 ≤ Ni, where Ni
is the number of rational points in the i-th projective curve
Xi. Since ℓi ≤ ni, we may take Ni ≥ 2ni + 1 and hence
gi/ni −→ 2/A(q).
We may also give analogous examples as in Section IV
using Hermitian codes and Garcı´a and Stichtenoth’s second
tower of projective curves. The only adjustment is that we
have to substitute the number of rational points N by n+ℓ+1
instead of n+ 1. We leave the details to the reader.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have given a new framework to construct
communication efficient secret sharing schemes based on se-
quences of nested linear codes, extending the previous Shamir-
type communication efficient schemes from the literature. We
have given two general constructions, one with small alphabet
but non-universal low decoding bandwidths, and one with
large alphabet but universal low decoding bandwidths.
By specializing the codes to algebraic geometry codes, we
have obtained communication efficient secret sharing schemes
with low decoding bandwidths and large lengths for a fixed
finite field, in contrast with previous works. The obtained near
optimality implies that, for a given deffect with the optimal
case, we may fix a suitable field size and let the lengths
be arbitrary large. Moreover, we have seen that the loss is
on the privacy thresholds, as in previous schemes based on
algebraic geometry codes, whereas the improvement on the
reconstruction threshold is the same as in the optimal cases.
We have also obtained constructions of secret sharing
schemes that are communication efficient and strongly secure
at the same time. In particular, we have obtained the first secret
sharing schemes with optimal communication efficiency and
optimal strong security, which has the component-wise secu-
rity advantages of optimal perfect schemes and the security
and storage efficiency of optimal ramp schemes, being also
communication efficient. Their field sizes are however lower
bounded by (but still linear on) the lengths, as previous optimal
strongly secure schemes. We have then given a construction
based on algebraic geometry codes with large lengths for a
fixed finite field, at the cost of near optimal communication
efficiency and near optimal strong security in the same sense
as in the previous paragraph.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 3. First, to obtain the
information rate and communication overheads as in Theorem
2, we need to verify that the dimensions of the codes in (14)
satisfy the hypotheses in Subsection III-B.
On the one hand, we have that
dim(D(1)[ℓ+1,ℓ+n]) = dim(D(1)).
Therefore the projection map from any of the linear codes
D(j) onto the coordinates in [ℓ + 1, ℓ + n] is a vector space
isomorphism. Thus
k(j) = dim(C(j)) = dim(D(j)),
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for all j = 1, 2, . . . , h. Now since D1[ℓ] = Fℓq, it holds that
ℓ = dim(D1[ℓ+1,ℓ+n])−dim(D[ℓ+1,ℓ+n]1 ) = dim(C1)−dim(C2).
Hence the parameters of the codes in (14) are as in Subsection
III-B, and we only need to prove the lower bound on the
strong security in Theorem 3. It follows by combining the
two following lemmas, where the first one is [21, Theorem
19]. We recall the proof for convenience of the reader.
Lemma 28 ([21]). Assuming that the secret S ∈ Fα×ℓq is
uniformly distributed, it holds that
I(SI ;XJ) =
u∑
j=1
I(Sij ;XJ , Si1 , Si2 , . . . , Sij−1 ),
for all u = 1, 2, . . . ℓ, all I = {i1, i2, . . . , iu} ⊆ [ℓ] and all
J ⊆ [n].
Proof. Since we are assuming that the random variable S is
uniform on Fα×ℓq , it follows that its columns are uniformly dis-
tributed in the alphabet A = Fαq and statistically independent.
Hence the following equalities follow from the chain rule of
conditional entropy (see [11, Theorem 2.5.1]):
I(SI ;XJ) = H(Si1 , Si2 , . . . , Siu)−H(Si1 , Si2 , . . . , Siu | XJ)
=
u∑
j=1
H(Sij )−
u∑
j=1
H(Sij | XJ , Si1 , Si2 , . . . , Sij−1 )
=
u∑
j=1
I(Sij ;XJ , Si1 , Si2 , . . . , Sij−1 ).
Lemma 29. If i ∈ [ℓ], I ⊆ [ℓ] \ {i}, J ⊆ [n] and #I +#J ≤
d(G⊥i )− 1, then
I(Si;XJ , SI) = 0.
Proof. Since D1[ℓ] = Fℓq , then by definition of the codes in
(14), we may choose a generator matrix of D(1) of the form
F (1) =

0 G2
Iℓ Gc
0 G
(h)
c
...
...
0 G
(2)
c
 ∈ F
k(1)×(ℓ+n)
q ,
where the matrices Gc ∈ Fℓ×nq , G2 ∈ Fk2×nq and G(j)c ∈
F(k
(j)−k(j+1))×n
q , for j = 2, 3, . . . , h, are as in Subsection
III-B.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 2, define
WI∪J = (SI , XJ) =M
′
hF
(1)
I∪J ∈ Fα×#(I∪J)q .
If Si ∈ Fα×1q is fixed, then WI∪J is the uniform random
variable in an affine space whose corresponding vector space
is
V = {M ′hF (1)I∪J | Si = 0} ⊆ Fα×#(I∪J)q .
There exist j1, j2, . . . , jk ∈ [k1]\{i} such that the correspond-
ing rows in (
0 G2
Iℓ Gc
)
I∪J
∈ Fk1×#(I∪J)q
are linearly independent and generate (Gi)I∪J ⊆ F#(I∪J)q . Let
G′ ∈ Fk×#(I∪J)q be the matrix formed by such rows. Finally,
define the linear map
ϕ : (Gi)αI∪J −→ V ,
where ϕ((λj1 ,λj2 , . . . ,λjk)G
′) is given by
λ1, . . . ,λk1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
D1,1 D1,2 . . . D1,h−1
D2,1 D2,2 . . . 0
D3,1 D3,2 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
Dh−1,1 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0

F
(1)
I∪J ,
where λj ∈ Fα×1q , for j = 1, 2, . . . , k1, and λj = 0 if j /∈
{j1, j2, . . . , jk}, and where the vectors Du,v are defined from
(λ1,λ2, . . . ,λk1) ∈ Fα×k1q as in Subsection III-B (that is,
considering (R,S) = (λ1,λ2, . . . ,λk1)).
First, ϕ is well-defined since G′ has full rank. Secondly, we
see that it is one to one by an iterative reconstruction argument
as in item 3 in the proof of Theorem 2, due to the recursive
definition of the matrices Du,v. We leave the details to the
reader. Hence we conclude that
H(WI∪J | Si) = dim(V) ≥ α dim((Gi)I∪J).
Therefore, as in the proof of item 2 in Theorem 2, it holds
that
I(Si;WI∪J) = H(WI∪J )−H(WI∪J | Si)
≤ α(dim(F#(I∪J)q )− dim((Gi)I∪J )) = 0,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 7, since #(I ∪
J) ≤ d(G⊥i )− 1, and we are done.
APPENDIX B
MULTIPLICATIVE SCHEMES
In this appendix we study parameters for which the secret
sharing schemes in this paper are multiplicative or strongly
multiplicative, following [9]. We will consider the Massey-
type schemes from Subsection V-D, and we will show that
they may compute αℓ products over Fq or α products in Fqℓ ,
in parallel in both cases, while keeping their communication
efficiency. It is left as open problem whether they are multi-
plicative over Fqαℓ .
Consider codes as in Corollary 26 and its proof, and let
F : Aℓ −→ An be the corresponding secret sharing scheme.
Let ∗ be the coordinate-wise product either in Fαℓq or in Fαqℓ .
In the second case, we redefine the divisor E from the proof
of Corollary 26 as
E = R+ Pℓ+1 + Pℓ+2 + · · ·+ Pℓ+n,
where R is an Fqℓ -rational point in X of degree ℓ over Fq.
To consider multiplicative properties as in [9], we define
a new randomized function F˜ : Aℓ −→ An, where if v =∑
i λi(si ∗ ui), for λi ∈ Fq and si,ui ∈ Fαqℓ or Fαℓq , then
F˜ (v) =
∑
i
λi(F (si) ⋆ F (ui)),
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where ⋆ is the coordinate-wise product in Fαnq on the right-
hand side of the last equation.
The new randomized function F˜ is obviously well-defined
and linear over Fq and hence can be described as in Definition
4. Following [9], we say that F is multiplicative (resp. r˜-
strongly multiplicative) if F˜ has n-reconstruction (resp. r˜-
reconstruction). Equivalently, the product of two secrets can
be recovered linearly by the resharing and recombination
processes described in [13, Sections 6 & 7].
Assume now that 2µ(1) = 2δ1 − 2 < n. We will show that
then F˜ has n-reconstruction. To that end, it is enough to show
that if λi ∈ Fq and fi, gi ∈ L(µ(1)Q) are such that
f(Pℓ+1) = f(Pℓ+2) = . . . = f(Pℓ+n) = 0, (15)
where f =
∑
i λifigi, then f = 0. However, if (15) holds,
then
f ∈ L(2µ(1)Q− Pℓ+1 − Pℓ+2 − · · · − Pℓ+n).
Since deg(2µ(1)Q−Pℓ+1−Pℓ+2−· · ·−Pℓ+n) = 2µ(1)−n < 0,
then f = 0 by [31, Corollary 1.4.12], and we are done.
Similarly F is r˜-strongly multiplicative if 2µ(1) = 2δ1 −
2 < r˜. In the case of the optimal schemes from Corollary 25,
we see that they are multiplicative if 2δ1 < n. Even though
this allows for reasonable parameters, such as ℓ = n/6, t =
n/6, r = n/3 and δ1 = n/2, it would be desirable to obtain
multiplicative schemes with the only constraint 2r < n (as in
[9]), but arbitrary ∆ ⊆ [r, n]. Overcoming this issue is left as
open problem for future research.
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